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 Lies, defeasibility and morality-in-action: The interactional architecture of false claims 
in sales, telemarketing and debt collection work 
Nick Llewellyn and Andrea Whittle 
 
Abstract 
Lying is known to be endemic in a range of business settings. However, to date studies have 
not analysed how lies surface, and are spontaneously managed, in ‘real time’ interaction. 
Drawing on video and audio recordings, in this paper we analyse how actors account for false 
claims produced in different settings, namely sales, telemarketing and debt collection. 
Drawing on resources from ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, lies are 
conceptualised as products of interactional organization, rather than, say, products of the 
mind or motives of social actors. Our analysis reveals the centrality of ‘epistemics’ for 
understanding how people handle, and seek to neutralise, the moral risks associated with false 
claims. Potential accusations of ‘lying’ are shown to be defeasible in light of claims that the 
speaker has ‘discovered’, ‘noticed’ or ‘remembered’ some pertinent detail. We recover 
practices through which false claims are transformed, with varying degrees of success, from 
nefarious to innocent accountings. We conclude by discussing the implications of our 
findings for wider questions about the reproduction of work cultures that rely upon deceit. 
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 Introduction 
Lying is ‘woven into the daily fabric of business life’ (Grover, 2005: 149; see also Grover, 
1995; Ashforth and Anand, 2003; Hansen et al., 2006; Shalvi et al., 2011; Brannan, 2017; 
Jenkins and Delbridge, 2016). Many recent corporate scandals have revealed institutionalized 
systems of deceit (Markham, 2006; Rhodes, 2016). However, few studies have analyzed how 
lies are subsumed into mundane everyday work activity. ‘Whistle blowing’ and ‘cover-ups’ 
are predominantly associated with large-scale corporate scandals (Munro, 2016; Weiskopf & 
Willmott, 2013). This association persists even though corporate scandals such as Enron 
(Markham, 2006) and the VW emissions case (Rhodes, 2016) show deceit to be an everyday 
activity that is ‘seen but unnoticed’ (Garfinkel, 1967). This paper is one of the first 
naturalistic studies to supply an account of everyday deceit, whistle-blowing and cover-up, 
revealing a repertoire of practices through which actors handle the moral accountability of 
‘lies’ in ways that manage blame and responsibility. 
Our use of inverted commas around the term ‘lies’ is an important aspect of the 
ethnomethodological approach we take in this paper. Ethnomethodology is a distinct 
paradigm of enquiry in social science (Button, 1991) that does not provide second-order 
social scientific theory of how social structure is generated but instead studies how members 
of society, as ‘folk sociologists’ (Wieder, 1974) or ‘practical sociologists’ (Benson & 
Hughes, 1983), use their own common-sense knowledge of social structures to constitute the 
social world through their interactions. We use the term ‘morality-in-action’ (Danby & 
Emmison, 2014) to refer to this ethnomethodological concern with how matters of morality 
are oriented to and handled in everyday interaction. As Danby and Emmison (2014) argue, in 
everyday life we routinely infer and invoke moral versions of ourselves and each other. False 
claims are one such situation where issues of moral identity surface most clearly. The 
 category ‘lying’ is only one of many potential ways of accounting for falsehoods and 
crucially, as we will go on to show in this paper, one that people may resist or contest. 
We use the metaphor of ‘architecture’ to capture our interest in the underlying form 
and structure of the interactional sequences through which false claims are managed (Sacks et 
al., 1974). Theoretically, we do not approach lying as a product of individually motivated 
behaviour, but of interactional organization (Sacks, 1992). People who ‘really are’ telling the 
truth can nevertheless be deemed to have lied, in exactly the same way that liars can conceal 
deceit and be seen, publicly, to have been honest (Goffman, 1959; 1971). The question is not 
so much which version or ‘frame’ (Goffman, 1974) is correct but rather how the status of 
false claims are interactionally worked-up in situ. We therefore develop an account of the 
public and intersubjective, rather than private and cognitive, character of ‘lies’. The term 
‘morality-in-action’ sums up the basic premise of this ethnomethodological approach, 
drawing attention to how people account for matters of morality in the moment-by-moment 
unfolding of interaction. This is an important conceptual step in our view and is something 
that has yet to be explored in the existing literature. 
Existing literature on deceit in organizational settings has sought to unearth the 
behavioural and cognitive manifestations of lies (Shalvi et al 2011), the normalization and 
routinization of lying at the organizational, group and individual level (Ashforth and Anand, 
2003; Jenkins and Delbridge, 2016; Brannan, 2017) and the moral neutralization techniques 
used by those who lie (Aquino & Becker, 2005; Kvalnes, 2014). Studies have yet to analyse 
how particular claims are interactionally constituted as ‘lies’. Instead, ‘lies’ have been treated 
as taken-for-granted facts. In this paper we will draw on audio and video recordings of 
interactions from three different settings - sales, telemarketing and debt collection - to reveal 
how ‘lies’ are ‘worked-up’ in the details of interaction and how lying is morally defeasible. 
We will show how this defeasibility hinges on ‘practical epistemics’ (Heritage 2012): how 
 speakers handle what they might reasonably know and what they might reasonably have 
forgotten or overlooked. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the first section, we review the literature on 
lying, focusing in particular on the study of deceit in business and workplace settings. Next, 
we outline the ethnomethodological approach we take and the distinct methodological 
approach this involves. We then analyse one false claim from each setting. The discussion 
draws together the findings to present an ethnomethodological account of ‘lying’ in 
interaction. The conclusion broadens the discussion to consider the implications of our 
findings for developing our understanding of how ‘cultures of deceit’ perpetuate in the light 
of the defeasibility of lies. 
 
Lies, deceit and organizations 
Lying has been extensively researched in the field of psychology. The quest to find a reliable 
method of detecting lies has been driven by a range of concerns, from criminal investigations 
to military espionage. The premise is that, because lying is a conscious activity, liars must 
‘give themselves away’ and the ‘cognitive load’ (Vrij et al., 2010) of maintaining the lie will 
be subtly manifest in speech or behaviour. Studies have assessed the relevance of behavioural 
cues such as camouflaged smiling, reduced head movement, increased hand movements, 
increases in pitch, and speech affectations (Fielder and Walka, 1993). The lie detection 
industry has generated a number of techniques and technologies purporting to detect lies: 
polygraphs, statement validity assessment, voice-stress analyzers, electroencephalograms, 
and functional magnetic resonance imaging (Ekman and O’Sullivan, 1991; Stix, 2008; Leal et 
al., 2010). In some cases, these techniques are used by organizations, for example in pre-
employment screening (O’Hair and Cody, 1987). 
 The literature on lying in organizational settings has focused on two distinct but 
related aspects: namely, the psychological and sociological factors influencing lying at the 
organizational, group and individual level and the moral neutralization techniques used by 
people who lie. The first body of literature focuses on the psychological and sociological 
causes and consequences of deceit. This literature recognizes that deceit is fundamental to 
work activities including sales (Carson, 2001), business negotiations (Wertheim, 2016), job 
applications (Snell, Sydell & Lueke, 1999), employee reference writing (Kvalnes, 2014) and 
managerial reporting (Chung & Hsu, 2017). This research has produced numerous insights 
into the antecedents and motivations of deceit and dishonesty. Many factors influencing the 
propensity to lie have been identified, not only self-interest. These include emotion (Yip & 
Schweitzer, 2016), conflicting role demands (Grover & Chun, 1994), the type of information 
being falsified (Fulmer, Barry & Long, 2009), the psychological cost of lying (Shalvi, 
Handgraaf & De Dreu, 2011), and the level of cognitive development (Chung & Hsu, 2017). 
Attitudes toward workplace deception have also been shown to be affected by perceptions of 
organizational fairness and equity (Greenberg & Bies, 1992; Gino & Pierce, 2011), power 
(Koning et al., 2011; Olekalns, Horan & Smith, 2014), levels of rapport (Jap, Robertson & 
Hamilton, 2011), social distance (Acke et al., 2011), the degree of rivalry and beliefs about 
competition (Roulin & Krings, 2016; Kilduff et al., 2016), pro-socialibility (Steinel, Utz & 
Koning, 2010; Levine & Schweitzer, 2015) and perceptions of trust and integrity (Olekalns, 
Kulik & Chew, 2014; Haselhuhn et al., 2017).  
In addition to these more psychologically-grounded theories, which are typically 
based on findings from attitude surveys and experiments, other theories grounded in the 
organizational literature and derived from interviews and case studies have been developed. 
These studies have identified the role of organizational factors such as training, socialisation, 
organizational culture, organizational identification and power relations that serve to 
 perpetuate and sustain systems of deceit in organizations (Fleming & Zyglidopoulos, 2008; 
Lindsay, Dunbar & Russell, 2011; Weiskopf & Willmott, 2013; Rhodes, 2016; Jenkins & 
Delbridge, 2016; Brannan, 2017; Kenny, 2017). 
A further body of work, most directly relevant to our focus on moral accountability, 
has considered strategies for moral neutralization through which deceivers lessen the 
psychological burden of deceit. Grover (2005) argues that people seem to be driven to 
rationalise their lies, lest they be morally tainted by the act of deceiving others. Acquino and 
Becker (2005) used an experimental simulation of lies in a business negotiation and found 
three techniques of moral neutralization used by those who lied: minimizing the lie, 
denigrating the target of the lie and denial of the lie. The selection of neutralization strategy 
was also found to be affected by the climate of the simulated negotiation and the 
consequences of the lie. Tasa and Bell’s (2017) experimental simulation of deceit in a 
negotiation situation also found that the person’s ability to morally disengage with and 
‘neutralise’ the consequences of the deceit influenced their willingness to engage in deceit 
(see also Shalvi et al. 2001). 
We take up the same question as this body of work, but proceed in a different way, in 
line with our practice-based ethnomethodological approach. We probe how people 
spontaneously deal with the moral implications of deceit in situ. Our research question asks 
how moral neutralisation is accomplished in practice through accounting work. We focus not 
on the pyschology of the liar but rather on thoroughly social processes through which actors 
manage the moral implications of their actions in the immediate aftermath of a false claim. A 
practice-based approach to the study of deceit is noticeably absent from existing literature. 
This is perhaps not surprising. It is relatively easy to study lies in experimental settings and 
measure attitudes to lying in surveys but much harder to study lies in situ. There is the 
problem of access and finding organizations willing to let researchers study lying as it 
 happens. Brannan (2017) has arguably got the closest to the practice of lying, studying the act 
of deception ethnographically from within an organization where he was an insider. We build 
on and advance this work adopting an ethnomethodological approach, which we will now 
outline.  
 
Research approach and methods: An ethnomethodological study of ‘lying’ 
This paper offers an ethnomethodological ‘respecification’ (Garfinkel 1991) of ‘lying’. The 
concept of respecification (Garfinkel 1991) involves three steps: firstly “take a 
methodological distinction or problem”, such as the difference between truth and lies in our 
case, secondly “treat the problem as a matter of routine local relevance for a particular kind 
of practical inquiry”, such as sales, telemarketing or debt collection in our case, and then 
thirdly analyse how “members make use of the distinction, and how they handle any 
problems associated with its use” (Lynch and Bogen, 1996: 273). Rather than treating lies as 
pre-existing entities, ethnomethodological respecification means studying ‘fact production in 
flight’ (Garfinkel, 1967: 79). A false claim might be treated as a ‘lie’, or it might be 
accounted for and transformed into something else. Any claim that is later shown to be ‘false’ 
can be opened to moral scrutiny, with or without anyone being directly accused of lying. 
Thus, we prioritise members’ accounting work through which they spontaneously establish, 
or deflect or deny, the moral inferences of falsehoods. The ethnomethodological approach 
means we do not judge whether member’s accounts are accurate and are “indifferent” 
(Button, 1991: 86) on this matter. Our aim is not to decide whether people really were lying 
or not. Rather, as Heritage (1984: 141) proposes: 
 
‘the question of whether and how mundane descriptions are evaluated, interpreted, 
accepted or contested – and in terms of what criteria and considerations – is an 
 empirical one. As such, it must be subjected to empirical scrutiny rather than 
determined a priori.’  
 
Ethnomethodology is based on a ‘central recommendation’ to study the ‘”reflexive” 
or “incarnate” character of accounting practices’ (Garfinkel 1967: 1). Methodologically, the 
notion of ‘accounting practices’ is separate from the wider notion of ‘accounts’. In 
interpretative research, analysts collect accounts through interviews, diaries, and so on. For 
example, in Jenkins and Delbridge’s (2016) interview study of VoiceTel, when talking to 
staff about lying to customers, one HR manager produced the account that customers have 
‘no real need to know’ (Jenkins and Delbridge, 2016: 8). To transform this into an accounting 
practice, it would be necessary to remove it from a research interview, and place it in a 
situated work practice. If this account was produced by a VoiceTel employee when accused 
of lying by a customer during their work practice, it would then be an accounting practice, in 
the sense it accounts for the prior accusation in a particular way. It accepts rather than denies 
that a lie has taken place, and is defiant rather than apologetic. Accounts are ‘about’ work, 
whilst accounting practices are ‘of work itself’ (Strauss, 1985). This is why Garfinkel (1967) 
calls accounting practices ‘reflexive’ or ‘incarnate’, because they do not reflect upon events, 
but reflexively constitute them. By studying accounting practices, we therefore extend the 
reach of prior organizational research on lying. 
This paper draws on examples from three work settings where lies are typically 
expected to be commonplace: sales, telemarketing and debt collection (Goffman, 1971; 
Grover, 2005). The first study was of a sales environment is a busy high street, where a Big 
Issue vendor sold magazines to passers-by. The Big Issue is a magazine sold by homeless or 
vulnerably-housed people. The second study was of a medium-sized direct marketing firm, 
who supply a range of services including ‘market research’, ‘training’ and ‘appointment 
 setting’. Our data relates to ‘lead generation’ work where telephone agents call up people to 
book appointments for sales representatives. The third study was of recordings of phone calls 
between a third-party debt collection agency that acted on behalf of their clients to collect 
debts from companies who owed money from unpaid commercial invoices. An overview of 
the three datasets considered in this paper is provided in Table 1 and the research consent and 
confidentiality process undertaken in each of the three studies is outlined in Table 2. 
 
--- Insert Table 1 about here --- 
 
--- Insert Table 2 about here --- 
 
For this paper, we analysed only the audio and video recordings of work practice, 
which were transcribed using the Jefferson (1984) notion system used by ethnomethodology 
and conversation analysis (EM/CA). Rather than searching our transcripts for the terms like 
‘lies’ or ‘lying’, we looked for occasions where initial claims are later shown to be false, 
finding a total of only three examples, which are analysed in this paper. This provided us with 
a suitable ‘collection’ (ten Have, 2004: 52); a methodological approach widely used in 
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, alongside single case analysis, involving 
identifying  a number of cases of well defined phenomena for detailed analysis (Schegloff, 
1988). 
False claims are a suitable site for analysing the accountability of deceit because, 
whilst not all false claims are lies, all lies involve false claims. False claims are ‘lies’ if the 
speaker knows them to be false; they may be ‘mistakes’ if they did not. Our analytic work 
focused on how participants both (a) held others to account for, and (b) produced accounts of, 
the discrepancy between the original claim and the unfolding events that rendered the original 
 claim false. We worked through each case drawing on methodological resources from 
conversation analysis (CA), a field allied to ethnomethodology (Sacks, 1992). One principle 
from CA is particularly important for our analysis; namely the idea that activity is 
sequentially organised. CA draws attention to how each turn at talk publicly displays a way 
of accounting for what has gone before, thereby generating a public record that is available to 
the recipient and the analyst alike (Sacks et al., 1974). An original claim that is later 
contradicted and shown to be false, for example, can be accounted for as a deliberate deceit, 
an innocent mistake, a realisation, and so on. In line with ethnomethodological principles, 
then, our analysis sought to understand the ‘architecture’ of members’ own accounting work, 
as a reflexively embedded property of unfolding sequences of talk and embodied activity, 
rather than replacing this with a second-order theory of what people are doing and why 
(Button, 1991). 
‘Rigour’ from within an ethnomethodological and conversation analytical (EM/CA) 
approach is not about things like sample size or the strength of correlations of variables. It is 
achieved by identifying an interactional phenomenon (in our case false claims) and 
systematically analysing the sequential structure of the talk-in-interaction (and associated 
non-verbal actions) in order to reveal the patterns in how people co-produce social reality in 
and through their interaction (ten Have, 2004). The approach demands that the researcher 
gets close to the ‘practice’ being studied, typically by recording it and slowing it down for 
repeated analysis, in order to identify the ethno-methods (members ‘methods’ or ‘practices’) 
being employed (Llewellyn & Hindmarsh, 2010). 
As the analysis of the three extracts progressed, we became increasingly focused on 
the role of knowledge in the way actors managed the moral implications of false claims. The 
data began to reveal a suite of epistemic practices (Stivers, Mondada & Steensig, 2011) 
through which participants negotiated what they, and others, might reasonably be expected to 
 know or might reasonably claim to have forgotten or not known. In what follows, we present 
our analysis of how people accomplished the transformation of ‘lies’ into ‘mistakes’ in one of 
three ways: by ‘discovering’, ‘noticing’ and ‘remembering’ various pertinent pieces of 
knowledge related to their prior claims.  
 
Findings: The defeasibility of lies 
Discovering 
We start with two straightforward examples, where relatively little was at stake, 
before progressing to a more complex and consequential third case. Whilst being relatively 
innocuous and straightforward, Extract 1 illustrates how actors handle the moral implications 
of false claims through reference to epistemic states, in this case through a ‘discovery’. 
At the beginning of Extract 1, a passer-by walks toward the magazine seller, who is selling 
the Big Issue on the high street of a busy city centre. The seller first ‘pitches’ his wares, 
saying ‘hello, the Big Issue?’ To avoid purchasing the magazine, the passer-by can either 
ignore the seller, decline the offer or produce an explanation of some kind. She does the 
latter. She has says ‘no change’, rather than ‘no money’, and this implies she has a note of 
some denomination in the purse she is holding in her right hand. But she is walking away 








 Extract 1: Discovering 
 
 
‘No change’ is the target claim in this first extract. Is ‘no change’ a lie, something the 
passer-by knows to be false? It would be an understandable lie. Her private reasoning may be 
relatively benign: ignoring the seller might seem rude, whereas directly saying ‘no’ might be 
blunt (Grover, 2005: 149). Her response preserves her moral identity (Danby & Emmison, 
2014) as someone who would be willing to support the homeless charity, if only 
circumstances were different. 
What kind of ‘inferential labour’ (Llewellyn and Hindmarsh, 2013) does the seller 
deploy to make sense of the ‘no change’ accounting? The seller has two options. He can infer 
that ‘no change’ was an indirect way of saying ‘no thanks’, which he could also infer from 
 the fact that she is walking away. Alternatively, he can make sense of it as an expression of 
interest: a matter of ability not lack of willingness. While the first might arguably be the most 
affiliative response, the vendor also has to make a living. The seller takes the second option 
and says ‘I’ve got change’ (lines 5-6). The situation is now entirely changed, perhaps in a 
way the passer-by did not anticipate. If she does not stop and buy the magazine, her earlier 
response may seem disingenuous, because it implied a willingness to buy the magazine. 
Within a matter of seconds, the passer-by is thrust into a changed ‘situation of choice’ 
(Heritage 1984). She stops, turns, and slowly walks toward the seller, opening her purse.  
It is only at this point that we get to matters of potential deceit. The problem is that 
her purse reveals that she does have change and she does not have a note. If she is going to 
buy the magazine, there is no way of hiding this. To purchase the magazine, she can only use 
coins and thereby reveal her earlier claim to be false. She is between a rock and a hard place: 
she can either walk away and thereby undermine the implied willingness to buy in her initial 
utterance, or purchase the magazine and reveal her claim to be false. 
At this point a lie has not been revealed. Certainly, her original claim has been shown 
to be false, but to reveal a lie, there is also the question of knowledge, and thus intent. For it 
to be a lie, the author of the claim has to know it is false (Fallis, 2009: 33). If knowledge is at 
the heart of lying, then, at the level of practice, accusations of deceit hinge on people’s ability 
to determine locally what speakers know, in this case about the contents of a purse. In terms 
of ‘practical epistemics’ (Heritage, 2012), is the presence of change in the purse she is 
carrying something she should have known about in advance? 
Returning to the extract, the passer-by looks in her purse and says ‘oh, I have got 
some change’ (lines 8 & 10). That is, she discovers she has change, because you can only 
discover things you previously did not know. She reveals the claim to be false through an 
epistemic accounting device. Her utterance is prefaced with the change of state token ‘oh’ 
 (Heritage, 1984), which artfully expresses the sense that she now knows something that, only 
moments earlier, she did not. Through this response, the false claim is retrospectively 
constituted as a ‘mistake’ and not a ‘lie’. 
The vendor is now himself in a position of choice. Should he ‘go along’ with these 
‘defensive measures’ (Goffman, 1974)? Or should he point to an act of deceit? Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, he goes along with her accounting. There is presumably no point in querying 
the moral identity of the passer-by at this stage, just as she is paying. While he could take a 
sceptical stance toward her account, he goes along with it, treating the ‘discovery’ as a 
newsworthy matter (‘have you, okay’), not as an attempted cover-up. 
In this initial exract we have started to illustrate an ethnomethodological 
respecification of deceit. We do not see deceit as individual behaviour, or as a cultural 
phenomenon (Jenkins and Delbridge 2016), but rather as a form of social practice. In this 
case, regardless of whether she was telling the truth, the passer-by has to ‘discover’ the 
change in her purse if she doesn’t want to be seen to have lied. This constraint applies 
regardless of her ‘actual’ intent or knowledge. As a publicly accountable phenomenon, lies 
do not reflect the speaker’s inner motives, but their practical accomplishment of ‘knowing in 
practice’ (Orlikowski, 2002). In this first empirical case, the lyrical upward intonation used to 
say ‘oh, I do have change’ (lines 8 & 10) stops this being a confession of deceit and accounts 
for her prior claim as an honest mistake. 
 
Noticing 
The second introductory example is taken from the study of business-to-business 
telemarketing. In this case a telemarketer is called-out for lying, but the telemarketer resists 
the accusation, treating it as defeasible, and presents an alternative accounting. As the extract 
begins, the telemarketer (T) is trying to schedule a date with a prospect (P) for a sales 
 meeting. The telemarketers job is to fill the diary of the sales representative, Sally (all names 
are pseudonyms), with appointments. The telemarketer has just opened Sally’s electronic 
diary and she makes public her ‘reading’ of that diary. The telemarketer says there is 
‘[nothing] for this week’ (line 4) and the ‘next available appointment is on the 9th of October’ 
(lines 8-9 in bold). This is the target claim (line 9), which is later shown to be false (line 16). 
As it turns out, the 9th October is not good for the prospect (‘not at all’, line 11), who states 
he is ‘off for that week’ (line 13). The telemarketer has to start again. She returns to the 
appointment schedule and offers a new slot, but one that is in fact earlier than the first one 
(which she claimed was the earliest one available), October 3rd (line 16). 
For Sacks, lying is ‘perfectly observable in the same way that anything else is’ (Sacks, 
1992, LC1: 559). One practical resource available to actors to observe lies are contradictions. 
In our data, contradictions are at the centre of the mundane model people used to observe 
deceit (Lynch and Bogen, 1996). Here, the telemarketer has said one thing (‘next available 
appointment is on the 9th of October’, lines 8-9) but then said another (‘I can do Tuesday the 
3rd’, lines 15-6), and crucially without accounting for the discrepancy. Moreover, she has 
done this in response to the prospect’s prior action (‘I’m off that week’, line 13) and so her 
response may seem ‘motivated’ and ‘strategic’ (Jenkins and Delbridge, 2016). 
  
The employee has slipped-up, whether she is lying or not. The prospect immediately 
orients to a lie rather than a mistake. He produces a mundane act of whistleblowing: an action 
that makes unethical practice public (Kenny, 2017). This whistleblowing is initially 
accomplished through laughter (line 17). The prospect’s laughter orients to the telemarketer’s 
response as a ‘lie’ rather than, say, an honest mistake. He is not laughing at her 
incompetence. The laughter is a ‘document’ (Garfinkel, 1967) of a ‘scam’, a stance he 
maintains throughout the remainder of the interaction. The phrase ‘that old chestnut’ (line 20) 
is often used disapprovingly to refer to a tired old joke or story that has been too often 
repeated, a reference here to a typical ‘sales trick’ that involves making a promotion seem 
more time-limited or in demand than it actually is. 
 But was the telemarketer ‘lying’? This again turns on the question of knowledge, and 
thus intent. For it to be a ‘lie’, the author of the assertion has to know it is false (Fallis, 2009: 
33). In this case, the telemarketer treats the accusation as defeasible. As with Extract 1, she 
makes relevant her knowledge, quickly invoking a relevant detail that changes the frame. She 
claims to have noticed something new when re-reading Sally’s diary. She describes only now 
seeing an appointment that is still showing on the schedule has been cancelled, invoking the 
difficulty of reading the small, and thus easily overlooked, lettering saying ‘cancelled’ on her 
screen (lines 23, 25-27). In her accounting work, the customer has got the ‘wrong end of the 
stick’. It was an innocent mistake according to the telemarketer, not a lie derived from a sales 
trick. 
This case powerfully reveals the sequential architecture of deceit. In this brief 
sequence, we have five main actions:  
(1) An initial claim (‘the next appointment is the 9th’); 
(2)  Which is declined by the prospect (‘I’m off that week’); 
(3) A second and contradictory claim (‘we can do the 3rd’);  
(4)  An accusation of deceit (‘hahaha, but you said’); 
(5) The ‘noticing’ (‘no, no, no, I’ve just realised’). 
 
Why does this sequential architecture matter? Suppose the sequence was re-ordered. For 
example, imagine the accounting device (position 5) had been produced earlier (position 1), 
while the prospect was pondering his availability. What if, before the prospect said ‘I’m off 
that week’ (position 2), the telemarketer had said ‘oh, hang on, I’ve just noticed Sally is free 
on the 3rd, is that any good?’ The sense of deceit would presumably be eliminated. What if 
the accounting device had prefaced the second contrary claim (position 3), so it became: ‘oh, 
I’ve just noticed Sally is free on the 3rd, it says cancelled here in very small letters, is that any 
 good?’ The sense of deceit would also presumably be reduced. The telemarketer’s moral 
problem is that the accounting device is invoked after the second contrary claim, and after the 
prospect has oriented to it as a lie derived from a sales trick. It therefore sounds like she is 
‘covering her tracks’. This applies regardless of whether she was actually telling the truth. 
Returning to the extract, the prospect overlooks the telemarketer’s accounting work 
and maintains his framing of her as dishonest, laughing throughout lines 23, 25 and 27. But 
he is not displaying moral outrage. He orients to a ‘playful deceit’ and ‘benign fabrication’ 
(Goffman, 1974: 87), one of the well-known ‘bluffs’ (Goffman, 1974: 102) that are part of 
the rules of the game in sales settings. Despite the telemarketer’s accounting work, the 
prospect sustains the deceit frame right to the end of the interaction (‘oh, that was good, that 
was’, line 25). There is no single ‘definition of the situation’ (Goffman, 1959) in this case. 
The action is simultaneously accounted for in two ways: as a ‘lie’ (prospect) and as a 
‘noticing’ (telemarketer). In this case, the prospect has nothing to lose by orienting to a 
deceit, but nevertheless does so in such a way that reflexively constitutes a ‘benign’ rather 
than ‘coercive’ fabrication (Goffman, 1974). They continue the interaction on good terms and 
proceed to book the appointment. 
 
Remembering 
The first two cases conform to a particular architecture of deceit, where one party 
potentially ‘slips up’. The recipient momentarily ‘sees through’ a performance. What they 
‘see’ are not ‘facts’ - in extracts one and two the relevant parties could have been telling the 
truth – but there also existed practical grounds for orienting sceptically towards some prior 
action. In the next case, we move to a different kind of case, where a debt collector 
strategically pursues a debtor to elicit a confession of deceit. Across numerous interactions 
(text messages, emails and phone calls) the debt collectors build-up a sense that ‘something is 
 going on’, orienting increasingly sceptically to a series of denials. The debtor does not 
confess to having lied but instead produces an account of ‘remembering’. 
The case in question concerns the purchase of a horse saddle at a price of around one 
thousand pounds. The saddle was deemed faulty by the customer, a small business owner, 
and returned for repair without full payment being made. The seller, the client of the debt 
collector, pledged to have it repaired and meanwhile lent the customer an equivalent saddle to 
use whilst the repairs were being made. At the time of the calls analyzed below, the debtor 
had received the repaired saddle but claims it is still unsatisfactory. She is yet to make the 
final payment, nor has she returned the loaned saddle. 
As we join the interaction, a person called Becky (all names are psuedonyms) has 
called the agency and is speaking to Amy (the debt collector) in response to a text message 
she received moments earlier (Extract 3(a)). Becky begins by giving an account number, 
from the text message, which Amy inputs into the system. Amy then reads the details of the 
case, giving the client’s name (Judith Parson). Amy describes a ‘saddle’ that was purchased 
and details some of the particular circumstances of the case. Becky is bewildered and claims 
to have no knowledge of the debt. Amy describes more of the details of the case to see if they 
might ‘jog your memory at all’ (lines 43-44). This practice establishes an interactional ‘slot’ 
in which the debtor can, if she is indeed the debtor, innocently claim knowledge of the 
purchase and identify herself as the debtor. This does not happen. Becky claims she ‘does not 
have a clue’ about any saddle. This is the target assertion (lines 56-57). Is she telling a lie and 
trying to avoid responsibility for her debt, or is this in fact a case of mistaken identity? 
  
Amy then proceeds to draw out three details that will eventually go on to play a role 
in Becky’s identification as the debtor (Extract 3(b)). The first is the address. Becky does not 
live at Appletree Crescent. However, when she later gives her address to another collector, it 
is just a few miles from Appletree Crescent. The second detail is her name. She is not Becky 
Williamson, but rather Becky Watson. Third, there is the telephone number. If she is not the 
debtor, how did the client have her number in the first place, for the text message to have 
reached her (lines 102-104)? This might be an innocent error, but it seems remarkable to the 
debt collectors that the number should belong to another person also called Becky. Amy 
builds the sense of a puzzle but she also plays her role with discipline; there are no ‘unmeant 




Amy’s work here is delicate. Notice how she does not apologise for bothering the 
caller, even though Becky has stated unequivocally that she knows nothing about the saddle 
and is not Becky Williamson. She keeps the caller on the line too, and works through the 
details. Amy plays the ‘good cop’. The frame is that of a ‘puzzle’ (Goffman, 1974). The 
caller is carefully forestalling ‘the immediate impression that [she] might be what [she] is’ 
(Goffman, 1959: 219), while the debt collector is carefully forestalling the impression that 
she is pursuing someone she believes could be lying. 
The call with Amy is closed on entirely cordial terms. Fifteen minutes later, Amy’s 
colleague, Dave, calls Becky back (Extract 3(c) below). He has been briefed on the details of 
 the case. Building on Amy’s previous work, Dave begins the call by orienting sceptically to 
her claim to know nothing about the saddle. The definition of the situation provided by 
Becky, that this is a case of mistaken identity, has not been accepted fully but neither has it 
been rejected outright. While he allows for the ‘mistaken identity’ frame (‘if- you are saying 
the truth I absolutely believe you’, line 148-149), he also finds something ‘strange’ in the 
close relationship between the details of the caller and the debtor (address, name and phone 
number) and concludes there is ‘clearly something going on here’ (lines 140-141). He seeks 
to extract a confession (from line 147) by invoking the potential financial and criminal 
implications of the deceit (lines 151 and 156). Even then, though, he refers to ‘to the person 
we’re pursuing’ (line 170) and does not assume that is the person he is speaking to, allowing 
for the possibility of mistaken identity rather than strategic deceit. 
This case is especially powerful as an illustration of our ethnomethodological 
approach. From our access to the details of the case as it progressed in the weeks that 
followed we learnt various things. For example, the collectors learn that ‘Williamson’ was 
her married name, and that when married she had lived at Appletree Cresent. She did buy a 
saddle from the client and was involved in a protacted dispute about it. But these apparent 
‘facts’ do not automatically translate into accusations of deceit followed by confessions. As 
we have seen, people find alternative ways of accounting of such discrepencies. 
Becky begins her accounting work by claiming nobody has explained the debt to her 
(lines 157-159). As with Extracts 1 and 2, the immediate matter of relevance then is 
knowledge: what the speaker can reasonably claim to know (and not know) about the matter 
at hand. From her account, even if she is the debtor, Becky cannot be lying because she has 
not been told what debt is being discussed. Perhaps she orders many saddles in the course of 
running her business and cannot remember the details of each one? This new accounting is 
thus rather neat and also suits both parties. If accepted as true, the claim ‘wipes the slate 
 clean’ and deletes the moral implications of her previous claims. It creates a new definition of 
the situation out of which she can listen to the details and then remember the saddle without 
having appeared to have lied. 
 
 
The debt collector then explains the debt, and the caller has a ‘moment of clarity’. She 
now ‘remembers’ the purchase. The interactional work is quite elaborate and pertains to her 
agency and cognition. It is not only that she now remembers she bought a saddle and then 
returned it and had one loaned to her while it was repaired, but also that this is surprising to 
her (‘this is my saddle actually’ ‘It is!’, lines 179 and 183). It is a revelation, but it is still not 
absolute: further checks are required. To be definitive, in her own mind, she needs to check 
and corroborate further details. She asks whether the debt concerns a company in a particular 
town in the South of England. Following the response, in further surprised tones, she 
exclaims ‘yeah I do it is’ (line 199). 
 There is one final way in which she forestalls the impression of being false. In 
response to her ‘moment of clarity’, the debt collector draws attention to the change in her 
position (‘arh: so you do know about it’, line 188). The stretched ‘arh’ preface is perhaps 
quite close to ‘calling her out’ (Thorlander, 2011). This question may have some force as an 
accusation. Her response potentially picks up on this contingency. Maintaining surprised 
tones, and even though she has already said ‘this is my saddle’ three times, she repairs the 
unmitigated claim to know about ‘this saddle’ by immediately replacing it with the more 
circumspect claim to know about ‘a saddle’. Without disclosing ‘Williamson’ to be her 
previous married name, something gleaned from later interactions, and in puzzled tones, 
Becky says ‘but I am Becky Watson’ (lines 199-200), maintaining the frame of a puzzle over 
a potential case of mistaken identity. 
 
Discussion 
Our study has generated two main insights into the practical organization of deceit 
from studying the interactional architecture of false claims. Firstly, we observed a pattern of 
suppressing accusations of wrong doing. Sellers and telemarketers have an institutionalised 
incentive not to ‘recognise’ deceit publicly. Hence, the Big Issue vendor knew people 
‘fobbed him off’ on a daily basis. Rather than saying ‘no thanks’, people would say ‘no 
change’, ‘I’ll buy it later’ or ‘I’ve already bought it this week’. In each case the vendor 
developed set-responses, none of which oriented to the passer-by as a liar. ‘No change’ was 
accounted for as a problem he might solve (as in Extract 1). ‘I’ll buy it later’ was oriented to 
as a ‘timing issue’. ‘I’ve already bought it’ was simply met with ‘thanks’. None were oriented 
to as a lie. His work practice was to cultivate a body of regular customers and accusing 
people of deceit would presumably be a false move in his practice. Likewise, telemarketers 
knew prospects would often falsely claim to be busy, rather than directly saying ‘no’ outright. 
 Telemarkers accounted for such claims, not as lies, but as descriptions of a scheduling 
problem. In Extract 2, it was the prospect who ‘called out’ the lie, but also minimised its 
moral import: it was a mere ‘trick of the trade’, rather than a moral breach sufficient to 
seriously disrupt the business of the call.  
The debt collector also had no interest in ‘calling out’ debtors for lying. In Extract 3, 
the debt collector came close to such a move when the debtor eventually ‘remembered’ the 
saddle (Extract 3(c), line 188). At that point, an accusation of deceit would presumably risk 
destabilising the debtor, perhaps leading them to hang-up, just at the point they ‘remembered’ 
the debt and the payment negotiation could begin. The debt collectors job, after all, is not to 
judge the moral identity of the debtor (although they may well have such private thoughts, 
just as debtors might have private thoughts about the moral identity of debt collectors as 
well). Their job is to recover the debt. We can conclude therefore that when potential ‘lies’ 
are uncovered, there are a series of ‘good organisational reasons’ (Garfinkel, 1967) for not 
labelling them as such. 
Secondly, our study has shown that in situations where deceit is potentially ‘surfaced’, 
it is accompanied by skilful accounting work that muddies the waters of any neat 
classification. This is quite different from saying ‘people are good at lying’. Such an 
argument hinges on the idea of lies as unproblematic social facts. In contrast, we have 
approached lies as on-going accomplishments (Garfinkel 1967). People who know they are 
telling the truth can nevertheless be seen to have lied if their public presentation or 
accounting work is incompetent. Goffman (1959: 219) gives the example of the honest 
merchant who can be falsely viewed as a con artist. In Extract 1, the customer has to 
‘discover’ change, or she would be seen to have lied, regardless of whether she ‘actually’ 
knew she had change in her purse. From this practice perspective, the issue is therefore not 
one of intent (Fallis 2009), but of the accountability of practical action. The ‘discovery’ has 
 to be accountably ‘authentic’ for the customer to cover her tracks, regardless of her motives. 
Theoretically, we have introduced a new approach, one that decouples lies from agents and 
their beliefs and intentions, focusing instead on patterns of public accountability. This 
approach has enabled us to show that when people ‘slip-up’, and give-off a sense of potential 
deceit, they always found some way of re-framing the situation by accounting for a simple 
‘mistake’. In each case we have analysed, while the accounting devices were different, they 
all made relevant epistemic matters pertaining to the speaker’s knowledge (Heritage 2012). 
As a whole, this study has opened-up a new avenue in the study of deceit, 
respecifying (Garfinkel, 1991) it as a lay phenomenon. Rather than presuming ‘truth’ and 
‘falsity’ are stable and easily separated, we have recover a ‘mundane model’ (Hester 1991) of 
deceit. The features of this mundane model are now summarized and contrasted with existing 
approaches to the study of deceit: 
(i) In theoretical and philosophical literature (Adler, 1997; Fallis, 2009) lies derive from 
motives and intent. In practice people do not have access to the minds of others, and 
instead ‘see’ potential lies from the way practical actions are put together. 
(ii) ‘Lies’ are conventionally contrasted with ‘truth’ (Serota et al., 2010; Schein 2004; 
Jenkins and Delbridge 2016). As a lay phenomenon, in our materials, ‘lies’ are 
contrasted with ‘mistakes’. This is the central ‘methodological distinction’ (Lynch and 
Bogen 1996); people labour to show a claim is false due to a mistake, rather than a lie. 
(iii) The ethicality of lying is said to hinge on ‘consequences’ and ‘motives’ (see Schein 
2004: 260). But at the level of accountable action, people can be seen to have lied even 
when they were telling the truth (Goffman, 1974: Ch 4). Hence, ethics from this 
practice perspective does not hinge on motives, but upon the competency of an actor 
within a practice: their ability to avoid missteps and skillfully account for missteps 
when they do occur. 
 (iv) In practice, people do not orient to the repertoire of hitches, perturbations and bodily 
ticks described in the psychological literature as methods of ascertaining the presence of 
a lie (Kraut, 1978; Vrij et al., 2010; Serota et al., 2010). To understand ‘lie detection’ in 
practice, a different substratum of phenomena needs to be engaged, including the 
formulation of claims, the sequential position of accounting devices and the appearance 
of contradictions. 
(v) In practice, lies are defeasible and are best understood as on-going accomplishments 
(Garfinkel 1967) rather than stable facts. Accusations of lying can be undermined. And 
attempts to undermine accusations can themselves be undermined. Even when it seems 
there is no way of avoiding a confession, a speaker might locate some line of argument 
which artfully deflects the actual or potential accusation of deception. 
(vi) The defeasibility of deceit hinges on epistemics in interaction (Stivers, Mondada & 
Steensig, 2011). In our three cases, the defeasibility of deceit hinged on the speakers 
knowledge of the contents of their purse (Extract 1), what was showing on their 
computer screen (Extract 2) and details of their previous purchases (Extract 3). Actors 
handled the moral accountability of false claims by retrospectively ‘discovering’, 
‘noticing’ or ‘remembering’ pertinent facts relating to their prior claim. 
Taken together, we propose that these findings sketch a mundane model of deceit: a suite of 
lay resources and reasoning practices people use to handle ‘lies’ as commonplace 
interactional phenomenon.  
 
Conclusion and implications 
In recent organizational literature, a number of commentators have pointed to the lack of 
research on lying (Schein, 2004; Grover, 2005; Jenkins and Delbridge, 2016; Brannan, 2017). 
This is all the more notable given that lying is known to be an endemic feature of numerous 
 industries, but especially perhaps sales and marketing (see Clark and Pinch, 1995; Grover, 
2005; Brannan, 2017) and debt collection (Goffman, 1971), the focus of our three studies. A 
notable absence in existing literature is the in situ analysis of ‘lies’ as they surface in talk and 
interaction. The practice of lying, as an empirical phenomenon in and of itself, has been 
largely ‘black boxed’ by the current literature. To extend organization studies scholarship 
further, we have taken a practice-based approach to deceit grounded in ethnomethodology 
that analyses ‘lies’ as observable and reportable phenomena.   
The idea that lies are ‘observable and reportable’ (Garfinkel, 1967) might at first 
glance seem contradictory. Existing research, reviewed earlier in this paper, is based on the 
assumption that lies are private and mysterious, only detected indirectly through sophisticated 
techniques and replicable only in experimental settings. This idea underpins the lie detection 
industry as well. Polygraphs, voice-stress analyzers and electroencephalograms identify signs 
of deceit from people’s voices and bodies (Stix, 2008; Ekman and O’Sullivan, 1991). In 
contrast, the American sociologist Harvey Sacks argued that the idea that ‘lies are 
undetectable because they are private is a figment of educated common sense’ (Hester & 
Eglin, 1997: 101). As we noted earlier, for Sacks, lying is also a publicly accountable 
phenomenon that is ‘perfectly observable in the same way that anything else is’ (Sacks, 1992, 
LC1: 559). People detect lies from the way courses of action unfold, rather than from 
twitches, perturbations or pupil dilation (Grover 2005, p.153). Sacks gives an empirical 
example involving a man who called a social services agency to report an argument with his 
wife (see Sacks 1992, LC1: 113). Quickly, and without any prior background knowledge of 
the caller, the call handler accused the caller of ‘not telling the whole story’ (ibid). From the 
structural organization of the story, and without access to the individual or the events being 
reported, the call handler recognized that a false version was being presented. She detected a 
‘lie of omission’ (Lynch and Bogen, 1997: 108).  
 In the organization and management literature, lies have been treated as relatively 
unproblematic objects. Lies have been treated as claims made by speakers who know them to 
be false (Adler, 1997; Fallis, 2009): such as the employee who pretends to be in the client’s 
office when they are not (Jenkins and Delbridge, 2016) and the call centre agent who 
pretends to be ‘activating’ the caller’s credit card when the call is merely a cover for selling 
add-on services (Brannan, 2017). Our study shows that, when they are surfaced as part of 
interactions, ‘lies’ are not so straightforward. Indeed, perhaps the most fundamental 
characteristic of ‘lies’ that this study has uncovered is that they are defeasible. If a speaker is 
accused of lying, or simply finds themselves in a situation where such an accusation could be 
inferred, they can and do craft an alternative accounting that resists or deflects this. The 
recipient, in turn, might treat this an attempt by the liar to ‘cover their tracks’: a lie to cover a 
lie (Grover 2005: 152). Or they might instead align with the accounting, and orient to a 
simple misunderstanding or mistake. In some cases, as our study has shown, the question of 
whether it really was a ‘lie’ might never be settled once and for all, with multiple accountings 
and definitions of the situation co-existing.  
By re-thinking lying in terms of the accountability of practical action, and analysing 
‘fact production in flight’ (Garfinkel, 1967: 79), we can start to gain some leverage on the 
interactional architecture of lies. In experimental research, truth and falsity are not ‘up for 
grabs’ in this way. The experimenter if the final arbiter of truth and falsehood. In contrast, 
our study has found that in everyday life both false claims, and accusations of deceit, are very 
much ‘up for grabs’. By producing an account of a change of knowledge-state (Heritage, 
1984) - in our three studies this was accomplished through accounts of discovering, noticing 
and remembering - the moral standing of the false claim is transformed and the meaning of 
the prior stretch of interaction is transformed from a nefarious to an innocent frame. The 
moral accountability of a lie is, we propose, something of a ‘slippery’ phenomena when faced 
 with something as apparently simple as an account that transforms the knowledge-state of the 
speaker (Heritage, 2012). We can therefore conclude that knowledge has forms of ‘morality’ 
associated with it not only through the ways in which matters of epistemic access, primacy 
and responsibility are handled in interaction (Stivers, Mondada & Steensig, 2011). We have 
shown that accounts of changes in knowledge-states are also woven into sequences of action 
that could be framed as ‘lies’. Just as the existing literature has identified psychological 
strategies for moral neutralization employed to lessen the psychological burden of the act of 
deceit (Acquino & Becker, 2005; Shalvi et al., 2011; Tasa & Bell, 2017), our study advances 
this further by showing how people also use interactional strategies for moral neutralisation 
to lessen the moral accountability for deceit, or even more fundamentally to deflect or 
mitigate the notion that an act of deceit has taken place. 
To broaden out the implications of our findings, we propose that defeasibility is 
important not only for advancing the understanding lying as a practical action but also more 
broadly for advancing our understanding of the perpetuation of cultures of deceit (Anana et 
al. 2005; Jenkins and Delbridge 2016; Hannan 2016). Prior literature has drawn attention to 
how organizations legitimise deceit through socialisation processes (Jenkins and Delbridge 
2016), the development of convenient in-group rationalisations (Anana et al. 2005), the 
amplifying effect of feedback loops (Fleming and Zyglidopoulos, 2008) and systems of 
culture management (Brannan, 2017). Our explanation from the study of work practice 
extends this work further by providing evidence that the morality of work arrangements, even 
those thought to be underpinned by deceit, has to be preserved ritualistically through daily 
work practices (Goffman, 1973; Brannan, 2017) and that these practices are best understood 
as fluid, contingent, on-going accomplishments (Garfinkel, 1967). 
Ours is one of the first naturalistic studies of deceit in the wider social sciences 
literature (see also Sacks, 1992; Lynch and Bogen, 1995). Having completed the research, we 
 perhaps understand why there are so few naturalistic studies. Our dataset was large, but ‘lies’ 
hardly ever permeated, or came close to permeating, the surface of publicly accountable 
discourse. Only once, in the second extract, is a deceit frame sustained through the course of 
the interaction, and then only by one party. We can therefore conclude that while deceit is 
presumably prevalent in the occupations we examined, it is typically beneath the surface of 
publicly accountable discourse. Even when it does permeate the surface, it remains a slippery 
phenomenon that is readily accounted for within a more innocent frame.  
Our finding that people account for actions (in our case false claims) by re-framing 
them in ways that seeks to reduce or remove their moral upshot also has wider implications. 
The approach we have developed for studying morality-in-action can also be used to study 
other workplace actions that attract moral evaluations and are typically viewed as disgraceful, 
dishonourable or deplorable, such as aggression, insults, back-stabbing or discrimination. It 
remains to be seen in future research whether changes in knowledge state also feature in the 
accounts produced in situ in these situations. If, as Danby and Emmison (2014) state, people 
work hard to avoid any charge of being ‘bad’ or ‘immoral’, it is important that we build a 
body of knowledge that can identify the methods through which moral versions of the self are 
assembled and managed in real-time workplace interactions. By pursuing this research 
agenda, a cumulative body of work can be developed that maps the interactional practices 
through which morality is handled in practice. To conclude, this paper represents a distinctive 
step toward the development of a practice-based account of deceit. We have dealt with very 
narrow slices of work practice, often lasting for no more than a few seconds. At this level, in 
the typically unexamined routine of everyday life, people become expert at using accounting 
devices that enable them to account publicly for themselves as acting in morally acceptable 
ways in the face of an apparent ‘lie’. These practices, typically ‘seen but unnoticed’ 
(Garfinkel 1967), supply the ritual foundations, not only of single interactions, but of wider 
 institutional arrangements that are stable despite the fact that they are potentially built on 
deceit. In this sense, we would argue that to understand socialisation into an occupation that 
involves lying (Ashforth and Anand, 2005; Jenkins and Delbridge, 2016; Brannan, 2017), it 
is necessary to reveal how people learn an apparently mundane but important skill: to be 
competent within a practice that requires, at all points, that any sense of deceit and subterfuge 
is kept from the surface of publicly accountable discourse.  
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 Table 1. Overview of the data and sample 
Setting Data Common claims 
Sales (Big 
Issue) 
38 video recordings of Big 
Issue seller on high street 
Informal conversations with 
Big Issue seller during work 
day 
By the sales target: 
‘I’ll buy it later’ 
‘I already bought it’ 
‘No change’ 
Telemarketing 197 audio recordings of phone 




8 hours of video recordings of 
telemarketer at work 
By both parties: 




272 audio recordings of phone 
calls between debt collector 
and debtor 
Access to emails/case notes for 
each case. 
By the debtor: 
‘wrong person’ 
‘unaware of the debt’ 
‘don’t owe the money’ 
 
  
 Table 2. Overview of the consent and confidentiality procedures 




Consent forms signs by 
vendor. Police clearance 
obtained. Researchers 
identified as University staff. 
Provided information to 
passers-by upon request. 
 
Anonymity waved by 
vendor who was happy to 




Telemarketing Wrote to each client to request 
access. 15 agreed. 
Letters were sent to each 
‘prospect’ asking for their 
consent. 
 
Data stored securely. 




Assurance of anonymity. 
Debt 
collection 
Consent forms completed by 
debt collectors and client. 
Informed debtor in writing of 
purpose of study and right to 
withdraw. 
Data stored securely. 




Assurance of anonymity. 
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